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Abstract: 
By the end of the 1990s, the Singaporean government had recognised the need to open up its banking sector so as 
to remain competitive in the global economy. The Monetary Authority of Singapore thus began deregulation of the 
banking sector in 1999 to strengthening the competitiveness of local banks relative to their foreign competition 
through mergers. This paper employs a nonparametric Malmquist productivity index to provide measure of 
productivity, technological change and efficiency gains over the period 1995-2005. The findings reveal some total 
factor productivity growth associated with deregulation and scale efficiency improvement largely from mergers 
amongst the local banks.   
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Since the beginning of the 1980s, financial institutions in many parts of the world have 
undergone changes brought about by deregulation, globalisation, privatisation and the rapid 
pace of development in information technology. This phenomenon is very evident in countries 
such as Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Similar developments are found in 
the Singaporean banking sector whereby recent regulatory changes have been spurred by the 
challenges of global competition. Singapore’s central bank, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS), recognized the need to deregulate its financial sector and open its domestic 
banking and insurance industries to foreign competition. This was undertaken not only to 
remain competitive in the global economy, but also to strengthen its banking system in terms of 
the quality of banking services and to maintain or increase market share. Both the Singaporean 
government and the MAS were well aware of the small stature of local banks by international 
standards and lags behind international banks “…in terms of technology, expertise, range and 
quality of service to customers” (MAS, 1999, p.1). Recent technological developments have led 
to banking services being no longer restricting to ‘bricks and mortar’ over-the-counter services 
with e-banking becoming more prevalent. This new approach to banking enables foreign banks 
to extensively reach out to domestic customers, which, in a matter of time, would further reduce 
and neutralise the advantages of an extensive branch network and implicit and explicit 
government protection (MAS, 1999).  
 
In 1997, MAS reviewed its regulatory policies and in 1999, launched the first phase of a five-
year programme aimed at liberalising the banking sector in Singapore. The programme, 
essentially aimed at the development and upgrading of local banks, had three key features: (i) 
an increase in competition from giving access to foreign banks to enter the domestic market; (ii) 
strengthening the corporate governance of local banks and attracting leadership talent so as to  
<additional information> 
 
reach a level of autonomy mature enough to make professional management decisions; and (iii) 
lifting the forty percent foreign shareholding limit. With the onset of deregulation, the role of 
MAS changed from regulation to supervision with the aim to “…monitor and differentiate 
among institutions by giving the stronger and well-managed ones more operational flexibility 
while maintaining stricter controls on the weaker ones” (MAS, 1998, p. 29).  
 
The onus was now on banks to effectively govern themselves through the setting-up of 
Nominating Committees to offer appointments to key management positions. The five-year 
programme, which includes a package of new banking privileges and licences for foreign 
banks, opened up the domestic banking sector in terms of the issuing of full banking licenses, 
known as Qualifying Full Banks (QFBs), to foreign banks. The first phase of the programme 
saw four foreign banks being awarded QFB privileges in October 1999. These comprised 
ABNO Amro Bank MV, Banque Nationale de Paris, Citibank NA, and Standard Chartered 
Bank. In addition, an additional eight Qualifying Offshore Banks (QOBs) and eight wholesale 
bank licenses were granted in the first phase of the programme.
1  
The second phase of the programme launched in June 2001 saw MAS freeing up the wholesale 
bank market by awarding twenty wholesale bank licences over the following two years and the 
upgrading of existing QOBs and offshore banks to wholesale bank status. In December 2001, 
MAS awarded two QFBs and sixteen wholesale bank licences, of which eight were converted 
                                                      
1 Wholesale banks are permitted to engage in the same range of banking services as QFBs, except for the 
acceptance of Singapore dollar fixed deposits of less than S$250,000 per deposit from non-bank customers, and the 
payment of interest on Singapore dollar current accounts operated by resident individuals. Offshore banks, besides 
having the same restrictions imposed on Wholesale banks, have slightly more restrictions on dealings with 
residents in terms of the acceptance of interest-bearing deposits from resident non-bank customers other than 
approved financial institutions. Further, the credit limit was limited to S$300 million to non-bank customers who 
are Singapore residents. But with liberalisation, the QOB privileges were relaxed and allowed to have their lending 
limit raised to S$1 billion, from the previous limit of S$300 million. QOBs were also be allowed to accept S$ 
funds from non-bank customers through swap transactions.  
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from QOBs. By May 2003, eight other wholesale bank licences were awarded. The second 
phase of the programme focused on the replacement of the restricted bank licenses with 
wholesale bank licenses. thus allowing a wider range of banking activities to be conducted 
(hence the renaming of restricted banks to wholesale banks). This move restructured MASs’ 
three-tiered banking license of Full, Restricted and Offshore banks, towards a more streamlined 
two-tiered licensing regime of Full and Wholesale banks. The upgrade of Qualifying Offshore 
Banks and Offshore Banks to Wholesale Banking status for the period 1998-2005 is evident in 
Table 1 with the rising number of Wholesale banks and the falling number of Offshore banks. 
 
Revisions to the QFB licenses were also carried out in the second phase with an increase in the 
number of locations from ten to fifteen. Prior to revision of the QFB licenses, foreign banks 
were allowed up to ten locations, of which five could be branches. The new privileges attached 
to the QFB license now increased the limits of foreign banks to fifteen locations, of which ten 
could be branches and the remainder as off-site automated teller machines (ATMs). In addition, 
QFBs could also provide debit services through Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale 
(EFTPOS) networks, thus enhancing competition in retail banking through the permitted issue 
of debit cards to consumers.  
 
As shown in Table 1, as of March 1999 there were 142 commercial banks, comprising 9 local 
banks, 22 full banks, 13 wholesale banks (previously termed restricted banks) and 98 offshore 
banks. By March 2006, there were 108 commercial banks, of which 5 were local banks, 24 
were full banks, 35 were wholesale banks and 34 were offshore banks. The drop in the number 
of local banks was the result of mergers and acquisitions: namely, DBS acquired the Post Office 
Savings Bank (POSB) in 1998; Keppel and Tat Lee merged to become Keppel-Tatlee in 1998; 
the United Overseas Bank (UOB) and Overseas Union Bank (OUB) merged to become UOB in 
2002, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) and Keppel-Tatlee Bank merged in  
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2002; and the Industrial & Commercial Bank (ICB) Limited and UOB merged in August 2002
2. 
The driving force behind the government’s desire for the consolidation of the local banks was 
the issue of size. Then Deputy Prime-Minister Lee expressed the rationale as follows: “…the 
logic of Singapore’s position is inescapable. If we want strong banks, then they have to be big 
banks and if they are big banks, then we must have fewer banks. This is the reality in many 
small countries”
3.    
 INSERT Table 1. 
Strangely enough in the midst of deregulation, Singapore’s largest bank, the Development Bank 
of Singapore (DBS), was not completely privatised, and though publicly listed was still partly 
government-owned in terms of shareholdings
4. Further, despite more foreign banks being 
granted QFB licenses, the privileges were still rather limited, even after the revisions in 2001. 
For instance, foreign QFBs are limited to sharing ATMs amongst themselves and are not 
permitted to access the local banks' ATM networks. Arguably, the most important reason for 
this quasi-market is national interest. MAS still has an important role in the form of supervision 
over the smaller banks. The strengthening of corporate governance to maintain a high 
prudential standard is vital to the survival of local banks in order to compete with foreign 
banks.  
However, failure to effectively supervise can have dire consequences, as realised in the 1991-
1993 banking crises in Norway and Sweden. Many banks suffered severely from substantial 
credit losses as a result of poor management and failure to appropriately evaluate the risk-
levels. In addition, the financial system problems are associated with the deflation of real estate 
values (Bartholomew 1994; Ball 1994). The eventual outcome was government intervention 
                                                      
2 Prior to merger, the Industrial & Commercial Bank (ICB) was a subsidiary of UOB. 
3 Quote from article by Angela Tan, BG Lee: Singapore to Stay Open to Global Players, Business Times, June 3, 
2001. 
4 Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd, a company wholly owned by the Ministry for Finance Incorporated, is the 
investment arm of the Singapore government. It effectively owns 420,170,835 shares (28%) of DBS holdings, of 
which 15.7% is owned by Maju Holdings Pte Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd.  
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through the issue of general guarantees and bailing out banks (Lindblom, 1994). In Norway, the 
two largest banks in Norway; Denorske Bank (DnB) and Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 
(CBK), were nationalised. The government’s long-term goal was to retain a substantial minority 
position (20-33.33%) over these two banks. In Sweden, the measures were less drastic with 
government bailouts (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken in Sweden). 
As recently as 2007, some of the major US banks, such as the Bank of America and Citibank, 
are now facing a similar crisis due to falling housing prices and problems in mortgage loans. 
The problems faced in economies with liberalised financial services is that the risk level rises as 
a result of gaining greater market share from increasing loans due to competition. 
Consequently, the failure to recognise the mortgage crisis would suggest that there was a lack 
of appropriate governing body in monitoring due to complete deregulation. Hence, while 
Singapore may be moving towards a more liberalised banking service, it still has some form of 
monitoring embedded in its financial system in the form of MAS monitoring the smaller banks 
as well as the government having some share of assets in Singapore’s largest bank, DBS. In 
terms of the level of government involvement, it still plays a substantial role as indicated in 
Singapore’s financial freedom index in the Index of Economic Freedom 2008 produced by the 
Heritage Foundation. Singapore obtained an index of 50 whereas the top ten economies had 
financial freedom index ranging between 70 and 90 thus showing the level of government 
involvement in Singapore financial services.  
  
In this paper, the main objective is to determine whether the merger of local banks as a result of 
deregulation improved productivity over the period 1995 to 2005. The estimates of productivity 
growth in Singapore’s banking over the period 1995-2005 are derived using the Malmquist 
productivity index. Sources of any productivity change are established by decomposing the 
Malmquist productivity index into changes in productive efficiency (catching-up up to the best-
practice frontier) and changes in the production frontier (technological change). While a myriad 
of factors may have contributed to changes in bank productivity over this period, deregulation  
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is arguably the most significant event within the banking sector.  
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 describes the Malmquist productivity index 
and its decomposition. Section 3 describes the inputs and outputs employed and the limitations 
faced. Section 4 presents the results in terms of productivity change, technological change and 
efficiency change and assess their significance in relation to deregulation. The paper concludes 
with some brief remarks. 
 
2. Malmquist Productivity Index 
  
The current study employs the nonparametric input-oriented Malmquist productivity index that 
decomposes productivity change into technical change and technical efficiency change. This 
approach has been adopted by many studies analysing productivity at the industry level, 
including Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren, & Roos (1992) in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) in electricity retail distribution and Price and Weyman-
Jones (1996) in the gas industry, among others. In terms of banking and finance services, 
related studies include Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992), Fukuyama (1995), Gilbert and Wilson 
(1998), Worthington (1999), Rebelo and Mendes (2000), Alam (2001), Mukherjee, Ray and 
Miller (2001), Isik and Hassan (2003), Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2004), Sturm and 
Williams (2004) and Rezitis (2006). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
The framework can be illustrated by Figure 1, following Coelli, Rao & Battese (1998). In this 
diagram, a production frontier representing the efficient level of output (y) that can be produced 
from a given level of input (x) is constructed, and the assumption made that this frontier can 
shift over time. The frontiers (F) thus obtained in the current (t) and future (t+1) time periods 
are labelled accordingly. When inefficiency is assumed to exist, the relative movement of any 
given financial institution over time will therefore depend on both its position relative to the  
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corresponding frontier (technical efficiency) and the position of the frontier itself (technical 
change). If inefficiency is ignored, then productivity growth over time will be unable to 
distinguish between improvements that derive from a financial institution ‘catching up’ to the 
frontier, or those that result from the frontier itself shifting up over time. 
 
Now, for any given financial institution in period t, say, represented by the output/input bundle 
zt, an input-based measure of efficiency can be deduced by the horizontal distance ratio 0N/0S. 
That is, inputs can be reduced in order to make production technically efficient in period t (ie. 
movement onto the efficient frontier). By comparison, in period t+1 inputs should be multiplied 
by the horizontal distance 0R/0Q in order to achieve comparable technical efficiency to that 
found in period t. Since the frontier has shifted, 0R/0Q exceeds unity, even though it is 
technically inefficient when compared to the period t+1 frontier. 
 
It is possible using the input-orientated Malmquist productivity index to decompose this total 
productivity change between the two periods into technical change and technical efficiency 
change. Input-orientation refers to the emphasis on the equiproportionate reduction of inputs, 
within the context of a given level of output. Studies such as Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992), 
Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), Fukuyama (1995), Gilbert and Wilson (1998), and Rebelo 
and Mendes (2000) employed this approach. Following Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), the 
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where the superscript I indicates an input-orientation, M is the productivity of the most recent 
production point (xt+1, yt+1) (using period t + 1 technology) relative to the earlier production 
point (xt, yt) (using period t technology), D are input distance functions, and all other variables  
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are as previously defined. Values greater than unity indicate positive total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth between the two periods. An equivalent way of writing this index is: 
2
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and M (Malmquist TFP) is the product of a measure of technical progress P as measured by 
shifts in the frontier measured at period t + 1 and period t (the geometric mean of the two ratios 
in the square bracket) and a change in efficiency E over the same period (the term outside the 
square bracket). Using this approach, four efficiency/productivity indices are provided for each 
financial institution along with a measure of technical progress over time. These are: (i) 
technical efficiency change (i.e. relative to a constant returns-to-scale technology); (ii) 
technological change; (iii) pure technical efficiency change (i.e. relative to a variable returns-to-
scale technology); (iv) scale efficiency change; and (v) TFP change. Coelli, Rao & Battese 
(1998) discuss the linear programs necessary to calculate these indices and the DEAP Version 








3. Data and Input/Output Specification  
 
The data consist of annual observations of twenty-six commercial banks over the period 1995 to 
1999 and ten commercial banks over the period 2000 to 2005. The data are drawn from the 
audited financial statements of the banks, purchased from the Accounting and Corporate 
Regulatory Authority (ACRA) (previously known as the Registry of Companies and 
Businesses) in Singapore. Seven other commercial banks were excluded through the technical 
requirement for a balanced panel of data: the Bank Nationale De Paris, Paribas Merchant 
Banking Asia, Bank of Tokyo, Union Bank of Switzerland, Mitsubishi Bank, Tat Lee Bank, 
and HSBC Investment Bank.   
 
The current study is an extension of Leong and Dollery (2004) which focused solely on the 
commercial banks. The sample size of 26 banks is in some way representative of the banking 
industry. Bank sizes ranging from SG$1.9 billion to SG$106 billion in 2000 allows the study to 
analyse productivity growth based on the utilisation of inputs and not driven by the institution 
size which is not a focus of the current study.  
The issue of determining outputs and inputs is highly dependent on the development process on 
what banks actually produce. This has been an on-going contentious issue in the banking 
literature (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992). In general, there are two main approaches to 
classifying outputs and inputs; the production approach and the intermediation approach. The 
production approach employed in studies like Sherman and Gold (1985), Berg, Forsund and 
Jansen (1992), Berg and Humphrey (1992), and Drake (2001) consider deposit-taking 
institutions as the producers of services associated with the loans and deposit accounts. Hence, 
loans and deposits are ‘produced’ with inputs like capital and labour. In contrast, the 
intermediation approach consider financial institutions as intermediaries and that the sole  
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purpose of banks is to raise funds through deposits and/or borrowed wholesale funds (managed 
liabilities) and transform these into loans and other earning assets. This approach thus identifies 
loans and other earning assets as outputs while deposits and borrowed funds together with 
capital and labour as inputs. Studies that adopted the intermediation approach include Millar 
and Noulas (1996), Gilbert and Wilson (1998), Rebelo and Mendes (2000), and Drake (2001). 
 
In the context of Singapore’s commercial banks, Leong and Dollery (2004) noted that the 
quantum of high value-added deposits compared to time and savings deposits is relatively 
small. Further, given the fact that foreign banks are legally restricted in their ability to accept 
Singapore dollar deposits, this would imply that their revenue share of interest-bearing assets 
would be larger than deposits (Leong and Dollery, 2004). It is based on these rationales that the 
current study employs the intermediation approach and identifies one output: loans to non-bank 
customers (y1) and three inputs: customer deposits (x1), fixed assets (x2), and personnel/staff 
costs (x3)
5. All monetary values are converted into 2000 prices using the GDP deflator of 
financial and business services drawn from various issues of the Yearbook of Statistics 
published by the Department of Statistics, Singapore.  
 
It is important to note that some banks do not provide the personnel/staff costs (x3) input for the 
years 1995 and 1996. Since the focus of this paper is the efficiency performance before and 
after deregulation, a two-stage approach of the Malmquist productivity index is adopted. First, 
for the years 1995 to 1999, which represents the period before deregulation, only two inputs, 
customer deposits (x1) and fixed assets (x2) are considered. Second, from 1999 to 2005 which 
represents the period of deregulation, all three inputs are used as these data are available from 
the financial statements of each bank.  
                                                      
5 Other studies used number of employees while the current study used staff costs. Conventionally, the former 
would be used but as some banks’ financial statements did not provide this information, we used staff costs as a 




For the period 2000-2005, the sample size was reduced from 26 to 10 due to the following 
reasons. First, the reduced sample was due to a significant portion of Japanese banks (Singapore 
branches) having shutdown from 1997 onwards due to bankruptcies faced by major financial 
institutions in Japan. This is further worsened by the recession in Japan from 1997 to 1998. 
Second, some other banks, including the Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Calyon Merchant 
Bank Asia Ltd and Credit Suisse (Singapore) Ltd, were excluded due to missing data in their 
annual reports/financial statements for certain years. Barclays Bank PLC was excluded as its 
data provided unusual figures in loans.  
 
4. Empirical results   
 
Table 2 reports the sample means of inputs and outputs by year for the period 1995-1999 while 
Table 3 reports the same information for the period 1999-2005. Before deregulation, the most 
interesting indication is the low average annual growth rate of loans (output) compared to its 
inputs. Largely accounting for the poor growth was the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997. Although Singapore weathered the Asian financial crisis better than many Asian 
economies, it was still affected by it due to its close economic integration with other regional 
economies. The effects flowed-on to the wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, as 
well as its financial services sector, with a slowdown in growth in these sectors. In turn the 
effects reduced the level of loans as well as the accumulated level of fixed assets.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
INSERT TABLE 3 
Since 2000, with the gradual implementation of deregulation and recovery from the financial 
crisis, growth rates for loans have improved at an average rate of 6.60 percent per annum. 
However, when compared to the growth rates of inputs, this would suggest that there was little  
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productivity growth. The above comparisons of means, while interesting, do not provide any 
productivity change analysis. Such an analysis is based on the Malmquist indices of 
productivity as detailed in Section 2 based on the assumption that banks operate under constant 
returns-to-scale. These results are presented and analysed below.  
Three primary results are derived from the Malmquist indices of productivity growth over the 
sample period. First, the measurement of productivity change. Second, the decomposition of 
productivity change into efficiency change (i.e. a ‘catch-up’ effect) and technological change 
(i.e. a ‘frontier-shift’ or ‘best-practice frontier’ effect). Third, the ‘catch-up’ effect is further 
decomposed into technical efficiency and scale efficiency: this helps explain the main sources 
of improvement. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
Table 4 shows the mean annual figures for total factor productivity (henceforth TFP), efficiency 
change and technological change, as well as the number of banks on or above the frontier for 
the periods 1995-1999 and 2000-2005. On examining the changes in productivity, efficiency 
and technology for the period 1995 to 1999, there was a mean increase in TFP of 1.2 percent 
due to improvements in efficiency (48.8 percent), but dampened by a decrease in technological 
change by 32 percent. Table 4 clearly shows efficiency change being the main driver of TFP. It 
is interesting to note that TFP in 1998 was below unity due to a decline in efficiency change, 
rather than technological change because of the effects of the Asian financial crisis. The 
implication from this is that many of the banks (19 of them) must have improved through best-
practice measures in reaction to the contagion from the Asian financial crisis. For the period 
2000 to 2005, mean TFP fell by 3.6 percent due to technological regress although there was 
evidence of ‘catch-up’ of around 23.4 percent. A finding that is similar to studies on banks is 
the efficiency change score. The relatively high efficiency change scores, before and after 
deregulation, are in line with other studies on banking efficiency such as Elyasiani and Mehdian 
(1995) for US banks, Favero and Papi (1995) for Italian banks, and Christopoulos and Tsionas 
(2001) for Greeks banks.  
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In regards to technological change, its mean score in post-deregulated period compared to the 
previous period showed signs of improvement (from -32 percent to -21.9 percent), whereas for 
technical change, this fell from 48.8 percent to 23.4 percent. What this suggests is that in 
general, banks have begun to adopt best-practice with the adoption of new forms of innovation 
to improve banking services such as e- banking which improves efficiency and enhances 
competition and convenience to customers. This is evident from Table 4, which shows 
technological change of over 1.00 in 2004 and 2005. Prior to 2004, technological change of less 
than 1.00 reflects most banks still in the process of introducing e-banking as part of their 
service. Wu, Hsia and Heng (2006) identified that e-banking was a disruptive innovation for the 
incumbent banks and required massive changes in the areas of both technological knowledge 
and business model. Such change require significant amounts of time and thus from 2000 to 
2003, the technological change was less than unity. 
 
An interesting issue to note is that with the onset of deregulation of Singapore’s banking 
services, the period 2000-05 exhibit lower TFP than before liberalisation. Economic theory 
dictates that with deregulation, the level of competition increases and in turn improves 
efficiency and productivity. Whilst this may not seem to hold true from the findings of Table 4, 
it is important to note that the sample size differs between the two periods and that the TFP 
score that is being examined is only an average score which may be exaggerated as a result of 
poor performance by just a few banks (ie. outliers). A more concise analysis on TFP would be 
at the firm level which is examined in Section 4.2. Nevertheless, to ascertain the contributions 
to the fall in mean TFP between these two periods, we further examine efficiency change as this 
indicator showed a deprovement between the two periods.  Efficiency change is decomposed 
into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency and their scores are presented in Table 5. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
As mentioned earlier the main driver of TFP change for both periods was efficiency change. A 
decomposition of this indicator into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE)  
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would provide more evidence for TFP growth. For the period 1995-1999, most banks were 
operating efficiently except for the year 1998, which exhibits the effects of the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997. In 1998, 17 banks were operating inefficiently, indicating that these banks could 
have saved, on average, 25.3 percent of (that is, 1 – E) in input quantities if they had adopted 
best practice technology. The productivity losses for this year are attributed to the decrease in 
scale efficiency of around 33.4 percent (1 – SE) which indicates failure to adopt best-practice 
management. This is expected when investments in banks fall during a financial turmoil 
resulting in surplus resources and thus poor allocation of available resources. For the period 
2000-2005, most banks were operating efficiently with both technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency contributing towards the change in efficiency with some meaningful “catch-up”.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 present the mean productivity scores for each bank for the periods 1995-99 and 
2000-05, respectively. The main aspect of this part of the discussion is to determine whether the 
local banks have shown any productivity improvement before and after deregulation of the 
Singapore financial services. The local banks are OUB holdings, KTB Ltd, UOB holdings, 
DBS Bank Ltd, and OCBC Holdings. For the period 1995-99, of the 26 banks, 12 had a TFP 
score above 1.00 which indicates productivity growth. Amongst these 12 banks, 9 of which are 
mainly investment or merchant banking operations and have TFP scores above the retail banks. 
These are Credit Suisse (Singapore) Ltd, Societe Generale Asia (Singapore) Ltd, Bank of 
America (Singapore) Ltd, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Royal Bank of Canada, and The Industrial 
Bank of Japan Ltd. One postulate is that these banks are more nimble and globally focused 
business with very diverse portfolios. This meant that their production functions were more 
geographically diversified and would thus emerged less battered by the Asian financial crisis 
compared to their domestically oriented retail peers.  
INSERT TABLE 6  
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The local banks performed modestly in that 2 of the 5 local banks had TFP over 1.00, namely 
OUB Holdings and KTB Ltd. TFP growth for UOB holdings and DBS Bank Ltd fell by 5.7 
percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. OCBC Holdings was the worst performer amongst the 
local banks with TFP growth falling by 11.5 percent. All five local banks however experienced 
some form of ‘catch-up’ attributed to improvements in pure technical efficiency - OUB 
Holdings (3.239), UOB holdings (3.03), DBS Bank Ltd (3.744) and OCBC Holdings (3.394).  
INSERT TABLE 7 
In the deregulated period, there was some improvement in TFP amongst the local banks. 
OCBCs’ improvement in TFP from -11.5 percent to 0.7 percent would suggest that the merger 
with KTB was the driving force. This outcome is supported by observing the scale efficiency, 
whereby OCBC improved from -59.5 percent to 27.5 percent which would imply improvements 
in operating size and management practices. OCBC’s improvement in technological change 
(from 0.644 to 0.713) also suggest the benefits gained from best-practices as a result of 
acquiring the Bank of Singapore Limited (BOS) in 2000, which during the dot-com era in 2000, 
was Singapore's first pure internet bank. The merger of UOB and OUB had similar results to 
the OCBC merger. UOBs’ TFP of 0.2 percent in the deregulated period was about the average 
of OUB (1.4 percent) and UOB (-5.7 percent) in the pre-deregulated period. With the merger, 
the improvements are clearly shown in the scale-efficiency scores from 0.432 (OUB) and 0.436 
(UOB) to 1.195 (OUB merged). DBS experienced TFP growth higher than pre-deregulated 
period with its merger with POSB in 1998. The above analysis would suggest that deregulation 
which leads to mergers improves efficiency as mergers remove the redundancies and raises the 
level of efficiency. 
 
The performance of the Singaporean branches of foreign banks also showed some unusual 
results. First, Bank of America improved in TFP from 33.3 percent to 42.4 percent largely due 
to improvements in technological change from -35 percent in the period 1995-99 to a growth 
rate of 12.6 percent in 2000-05. Decomposing the efficiency change into technical efficiency  
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and scale efficiency shows the latter falling from 2.052 to 1.265. Second, Standard Chartered 
Bank improved in TFP from 4.1 percent in 1995-99 to 12.9 percent in 2000-05 with 
improvements made in technological change indicating a move towards best-practice decision-
making. Third, Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft showed significant improvement with a TFP 
growth from -43.2 percent in 1995-99 to 8.7 percent in 2000-05. The main improvement was 
largely in both efficiency change (-11.2 percent to 46.3 percent) and technological change (-
36.1 percent to-25.7 percent). The significant improvement in efficiency change is attributed to 
pure technical efficiency from -15.7 percent to 39.7 percent for the same periods. Fourth, 
Citibank N.A. experienced significant TFP growth from -7.4 percent in 1995-99 to 1.6 percent 
in 2000-05 largely driven by technological change: there was no ‘catch-up’. Finally JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd and Royal Bank of Canada fared poorly in the 
deregulated period with falls in TFP from 29.9 to -8.1 percent, -16 to -31.1, and 17.1 to -34.5 
percent, respectively. Falling TFP for JP Morgan Chase Bank and Royal Bank of Canada was 
attributed to deterioration in efficiency change, primarily scale efficiency while for Mizuho 
Corporate Bank’s poor performance this was attributed to falling pure technical efficiency from 
36.7 to 0 percent. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks   
 
This paper analysed productivity growth in Singapore’s banking sector before and following 
deregulation. Using a two-stage approach, the Malmquist productivity index allowed a 
comparison of the changes in productivity in terms of efficiency change and technological 
change between the pre-deregulated period and post-deregulated period. Two outcomes were 
revealed in our findings. First, the results from our study follow a similar pattern to Gilbert and 
Wilson (1998) for Korean banks, Mukherjee, Ray and Millar’s (2001) for US banks, Casu, 
Girardone and Molyneux (2004) on European banks, and Rezitis (2006) on Greek banks that  
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deregulation improves productivity growth. In the deregulated period, 7 of the 10 banks 
experienced some productivity growth, mainly driven by improving best practices 
(technological change). Second, although no significant ‘catch-up’ was evident, deregulation 
improved operational size (i.e. scale efficiency) with the several bank mergers. This was one of 
the main findings in the current study which aimed at determining the outcome from the 
mergers of local banks.  
 
Whilst the study has provided some promising results, it should be noted that one of the main 
limitations of the current study was the use of a small sample size for the second period. A large 
sample size would have provided more robust results, especially when using the Malmquist 
productivity index model. Nonetheless, this is a first step towards examining the level of 
efficiency of Singapore banks since deregulation. Future studies on this would aim at not only 
increasing the sample size, but to improve on the data outputs where available, such as non-
lending activities (securities), risk-adjusted off-balance sheet items, and other earning assets. 
So has Singapore benefited from deregulating its banking sector? In the years since 2000, there 
has been some improvement, although it is relatively insignificant. This was the immediate 
response to the growing foreign competition which resulted in the mergers of many local banks 
into just a few conglomerates. However, as shown in Lindblom (1994) and the recent crisis of 
mortgage defaults experienced by some of the major US banks in 2007, complete liberalised 
financial services can still falter largely due to failure in risk-management and the lack of 
appropriate counter-measures (ie. like a prudential authority or governing body overseeing the 
operations). In the case of Singapore, the process of deregulation is ongoing, and as such it is 
still in its infancy in terms of deregulation. However, with a governing body like the MAS 
whose role is to supervise and monitor the operations of banks, and Singapore’s sound 
economic management which has weathered the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, 
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Table 1. Number of commercial banks in Singapore by license type, 1998-2006 
 
   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Local
a  12 9 8 8 6 5 5 5 5 
Foreign Full 
Bk
22 22 23 23 22 22 23 24 24 
Wholesale 
Bk
13 13 16 20 33 31 37 35 34 
Offshore 
Bk
107 98 93 82 59 59 50 47 45 
Total  154 142 140 133 120 117 115 111 108 
Notes: All local banks are full banks. Figures at March end.  
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Table 2: Means of inputs and outputs, 1995 - 1999 (in millions of SG$ at 2000 prices), 
 




y1: loans to non-bank customers  8,060 10,103 10,852  9,921  8,840  2.31 
x1: customer deposits  5,677 7,202 8,108 9,470  10,815  16.11 
x2:  fixed  assets  116 150 111 185 204  14.11 





Table 3: Means of inputs and outputs, 1999 - 2005 (in millions of SG$ at 2000 prices), 
 






y1: loans to non-
bank  customers  15,500 15,296 20,573 18,504 21,562 23,100 23,032 6.60 
x1: customer 
deposits  21,485 21,822 28,302 26,102 30,756 32,200 31,728 6.49 
x2:  fixed  assets  426 431 605 540 567 531 526  3.51 
x3:  staff  costs  156 187 229 223 247 264 295  10.62 





Table 4: TFP, efficiency and technological change scores in Singaporean banks 
(annual mean) 
   TFP  change  Efficiency  Change Technological  Change 








1996  26 1.297 20 1.463 24 0.887  0 
1997  26 1.055 11 2.057 22 0.513  0 
1998  26  0.756 9 0.747 9 1.013  19 
1999  26 1.015 10 2.185 24 0.465  1 
Mean   1.012  1.488  0.680  
         
2000  10 1.006  4  1.672 10 0.602  0 
2001  10  1.085 4 1.263 7 0.859 2 
2002  10  0.822 2 1.322 9 0.622 1 
2003  10  0.806 5 1.210 8 0.666 2 
2004  10  1.302 7 1.291 7 1.009 9 
2005  10  0.853 2 0.810 1 1.053 8 






Table 5: Efficiency scores in Singaporean banks, 1996-2005 (annual mean) 
   Efficiency  Change  (E)  Pure Technical Efficiency 
(PTE) 
Scale Efficiency (SE) 








1996  26 1.463 24 1.000 14 1.463 24 
1997  26 2.057 22 2.444 25 0.841  7 
1998  26 0.747  9  1.120 15 0.666 14 
1999  26 2.185 24 1.812 22 1.206 21 
Mean   1.488  1.492  0.997  
         
2000  10 1.672 10 2.127 10 0.786  6 
2001  10 1.263  7  1.367 10 0.923  6 
2002  10  1.322 9 1.006 9 1.315 8 
2003  10 1.210  8  1.122 10 1.079  6 
2004  10 1.291  7  1.127 10 1.146  6 
2005  10  0.810 1 0.821 6 0.986 3 






Table 6: Ranked TFP scores by individual banks, 1995-1999 (annual mean) 










Credit Suisse (Singapore)  Ltd  2.803 0.792 2.177  1.287  2.219 
Societe Generale Asia (Singapore)  Ltd  2.377 0.714 1.325  1.794  1.697 
Bank of America (Singapore)  Ltd  2.052 0.650 1.000  2.052  1.333 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York  1.794  0.726  1.443  1.243  1.303 
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.  2.061  0.630  1.303  1.582  1.299 
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft  1.921 0.660 1.624  1.183  1.267 
Royal Bank of Canada  1.811  0.646  1.393  1.300  1.171 
OCBC  Trustee  Ltd  1.578 0.731 1.743  0.905  1.154 
The Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd  1.536  0.693  1.319  1.164  1.065 
Standard Chartered Bank  1.644 0.633 1.516  1.084  1.041 
OUB  Holdings  1.399 0.725 3.239  0.432  1.014 
KTB  Ltd  1.488 0.677 1.458  1.020  1.007 
Credit Agricole (Suisse) SA    1.381 0.712 1.323  1.044  0.983 
The Tokai Bank Ltd  1.329 0.713 1.270  1.046  0.948 
UOB  Holdings  1.321 0.714 3.030  0.436  0.943 
Citibank  N.A.  1.423 0.651 1.351  1.053  0.926 
DBS Bank Ltd  1.284  0.714  3.744  0.343  0.917 
The Sakura Bank  1.429  0.634  1.326  1.078  0.906 
OCBC  Holdings  1.375 0.644 3.394  0.405  0.885 
ABN AMRO Asia Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd  1.300 0.665 1.000  1.300  0.865 
Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd  1.330 0.632 1.367  0.973  0.840 
Calyon Merchant Bank Asia  Ltd  1.082 0.763 0.998  1.084  0.826 
Barclays Bank PLC  1.272 0.622 1.156  1.100  0.791 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation  1.155 0.672 1.061  1.089  0.777 
The Asahi Bank Ltd  1.000  0.670  1.000  1.000  0.670 





Table 7: Ranked TFP scores by individual banks, 2000-2005 (annual mean) 










Bank of America (Singapore)  Ltd  1.265 1.126 1.000  1.265  1.424 
Standard Chartered Bank  1.465 0.771 1.551  0.945  1.129 
Dresdner Bank Aktiengesellschaft  1.463 0.743 1.397  1.047  1.087 
Citibank  N.A.  1.355 0.750 1.496  0.906  1.016 
UOB  Holdings  1.399 0.716 1.170  1.195  1.002 
OCBC  Holdings  1.372 0.713 1.076  1.275  0.978 
DBS Bank Ltd  1.329  0.724  1.000  1.329  0.962 
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.  1.351  0.680  1.327  1.018  0.919 
Mizuho Corporate Bank Ltd  0.957 0.719 1.000  0.957  0.689 
Royal Bank of Canada  0.676  0.968  1.176  0.575  0.655 
 
 
 
 
 